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Abstract  
Firms can be horizontally diversified, with considerable breadth, or vertically integrated, with 
great depth. This study explores how breadth and depth affect each other as influenced by 
capability requirements and coordination demands. Using construction industry data, we 
assess the interdependence between contractors’ portfolios of building types (horizontal 
scope) and the extent of integration of the activities needed to complete each project (vertical 
scope). We find that vertical and horizontal scope have a negative interdependency only 
when contractors face managerial constraints due to coordination challenges.  Further, we 
show that this effect can be mitigated through organizational structures that centralize key 
functions. Our findings highlight the importance of coordination in the theory of the firm, as 
we link firm boundaries to managerial coordination and internal organization.  
INTRODUCTION 
Firms come in different shapes.  Some are horizontally broad, with many product 
lines or project types; others are vertically deep, integrated into several stages of the value 
chain upstream or downstream. Other firms may be tightly focused in a single market or 
value chain stage; whereas some may be both broad and deep.  Research has found that 
horizontal breadth improves performance due to scope economies, synergistic use of 
resources, and leveraging of complementary assets (Palich, Cardinal, & Miller, 2000; Panzar 
and Willig, 1981; Teece, 1982), but that coordination, adjustment and execution costs can 
limit these benefits (Hashai, 2015; Wan, Hoskisson, Short, & Yiu, 2011; Zhou 2011).  
Likewise, vertical depth may help firms to improve the governance of their activities and 
exploit strong internal capabilities, (Argyres, 1996; Leiblein & Miller, 2003; Williamson, 
1985), but its benefits are limited by the costs of hierarchical governance, such as 
coordination and monitoring (Perry, 1989; Williamson, 1985).  
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Although the choice of horizontal breadth and vertical depth are among the most 
important decisions in corporate strategy, we don’t fully understand the relationship between 
them. The few studies that have addressed this relationship have found interdependencies, but 
arrived at different conclusions. Some studies have suggested positive interdependencies 
between depth and breadth (Chandler, 1962; Leiblein & Miller, 2003; Tanriverdi & Lee, 
2008; Zhou & Wan, 2016), while others have documented negative interdependencies 
(Rawley & Simcoe, 2010; Van Biesenbroeck, 2007; Zhou, 2011).  In addition to these 
conflicting results, all of these studies investigated how a change in one type of scope 
subsequently influenced the other scope dimension.  Although the nature of these decisions 
would imply mutual influence and simultaneity (Argyres & Zenger, 2012), no study has yet 
explored if breadth and depth do indeed affect each other simultaneously.   
Building on previous studies and filling this gap, we explore the interdependencies 
between horizontal breadth and vertical depth. Based on the resource-based view of the firm, 
we begin analyzing the effect of capabilities, as they influence horizontal breadth and vertical 
depth (Argyres, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1982).  We start with 
the premise that capabilities are often specific to a particular scope direction, such as 
marketing skills leading to horizontal breadth and production expertise leading to vertical 
depth (Perry, 1989; Tanriverdi & Lee, 2008; Teece & Pisano, 1994; Vorhies, Morgan, & 
Autry, 2009). In addition, we further recognize that executive capabilities, which we define 
as the ability of the top management team to administer, orchestrate and coordinate the entire 
set of firm activities, can affect both breadth and depth (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Helfat & 
Peteraf, 2015; Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland, & Gilbert, 2011).  If executive capabilities are relatively 
unconstrained, then we should observe independence between breadth and depth, as firms can 
handle managing these differing activities using scope-specific capabilities.  However, if 
executive capabilities become constrained, such as when coordination challenges are acute, 
Can firms be both broad and deep? 4 
we would see a negative interdependency between breadth and depth. We analyze the 
interdependency from breadth to depth and from depth to breadth to differentiate the 
direction of influence. It is possible that, due to a differential impact on executive 
capabilities, the effect might be more powerful in one direction than in the other. 
We further analyze how the firm’s organizational structure can affect executive capability 
constraints and thus relax the trade-off between horizontal breadth and vertical depth. We 
rely on transaction cost economics (TCE) to argue that even in the absence of asset 
specificity, frictions can generate costly haggling and renegotiations that will require 
coordinated adaptation, implying the use of common authority (e.g., Williamson, 1975; 
Gibbons, 2005).  We focus on centralization as a structural feature that can mitigate these 
frictions and ease coordination. Centralization can facilitate the coordination and 
management of frictions that may arise from more horizontal breath or vertical depth and thus 
assuage the trade-off between breadth and depth when coordination needs are high. 
We test our arguments through an investigation of the Chilean construction industry, 
using an extensive and rich database that spans 355 firms and nearly 40% of the projects built 
in the country over an eight-year period. Our data allow us to precisely measure horizontal 
breadth based upon the types of projects each contractor executes (e.g., residential housing, 
educational facilities, hospitals, etc.) and the contractor’s vertical depth as indicated by the 
extent of vertical integration in specialty trade activities performed (e.g., plumbing, painting, 
formwork, etc.). This is a mature industry, with no dominant players, but with heterogeneity 
among approaches, as some firms are vertically deep, some horizontally broad, some quite 
focused, and still others both broad and deep.  This high level of variation in terms of scope 
choices allows us to study breadth and depth simultaneously.  Another advantage is that our 
industry setting has distinguishable capabilities that can be cleanly connected to vertical 
depth or horizontal breadth decisions, and thus, these measures can be used as instruments in 
Can firms be both broad and deep? 5 
our simultaneous equations model. Additionally, the availability of organizational structure 
variables at the firm level (e.g., centralization of internal decision rights) allows studying how 
centralization of decision making mitigates the trade-off between breadth and depth.  
Our results support our premise and indicate that horizontal breadth and vertical depth 
decisions are driven by scope-specific capabilities and thus are essentially independent. 
However, we find that when coordination challenges are high, there is a significant negative 
trade-off between breadth and depth.  That is, the greater the coordination demands, the more 
challenging it is for firms to be both broad and deep, or vice versa, affirming our predictions 
involving trade-offs based upon executive constraints.  Finally, consistent with TCE, we find 
that centralized structures relax these constraints and therefore mitigate the negative trade-off 
between breadth and depth.  We verify our results by interviewing industry executives who 
supported our findings and supported our proposed mechanisms.  
Our paper contributes to the strategy literature by tackling the relationship between 
horizontal breadth and vertical depth decisions and proposing mechanisms that drive this 
interdependency. First, we study the simultaneous interdependency of breadth and depth, 
reflecting more accurately the realities and intricacies of these choices.  The analysis of 
bidirectionality is important because the interrelationship between depth and breadth does not 
need to be symmetric. We provide both theoretical logic about this relationship and rigorous 
empirical testing that indicates the importance of both scope-specific and broader executive 
capabilities.  Second, we provide a mechanism based upon constrained executive capability 
due to coordination demands that drives the relationship between breadth and depth.  When 
these demands are modest, breadth and depth will be independent and can co-exist.  
However, when these demands are more severe, managers cannot attend to all of the details 
and activities involved, resulting in a negative and simultaneous relationship between breadth 
and depth.  
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 Third, we analyze organizational structure variables that can influence the trade-off 
between these scope choices as they facilitate joint coordination of different firm-level 
functions. Although structure has been widely analyzed in the strategy literature, its effect on 
a possible trade-off between vertical depth and horizontal breadth has not been studied. Our 
novel analysis of how internal structure affects the tension between horizontal breath and 
vertical depth provides further insights about the interrelationships between major corporate 
strategy decisions. Finally, we contribute to the TCE literature by applying this theory both at 
the firm boundary level and within the firm.  We use the opportunism strand to determine 
initial vertical firm boundaries and then the adaptation strand to understand how internal 
centralization can affect both horizontal and vertical boundaries through its impact on 
executive capabilities. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of coordination in the 
theory of the firm, as we link firm boundaries to managerial coordination and internal 
organization. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Our study focuses on the interdependencies of horizontal breadth and vertical depth in 
firms. Interdependencies can be positive or negative. They are positive if an expansion in 
breadth (depth) results in an expansion in depth (breadth) and they are negative if an 
expansion in breadth (depth) results in a reduction in depth (breadth). Empirical evidence on 
interdependence between breadth and depth is mixed.  Recently, Zhou and Wang (2016) used 
a detailed econometric case study of a soft-drink concentrate producer to show that vertical 
depth in the bottling industry improves product-level efficiency for the integrated company, 
increasing the incentives to expand its horizontal breadth. This result is similar in spirit to 
Chandler’s classic study (1962), and to Tanriverdi and Lee’s (2008) work in the software 
industry, who found that related diversification in software product-markets is 
complementary to increased scope in the vertical domain of operating systems platforms. In a 
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similar vein, Leiblein and Miller (2003) show that a higher product market scope is 
associated with more vertical integration in semiconductor firms. In contrast, Rawley and 
Simcoe (2010) show that taxicab firms who diversify into the limousine business 
subsequently increase outsourcing, shifting their fleet composition toward more owner-
operator drivers, whereas Zhou (2011) finds that outsourcing existing activities along the 
vertical value chain may free up coordination capability for horizontal diversification, 
supporting a negative relationship between breadth and depth. Further, Van Biesebroeck 
(2007) analyzed automobile plants and found that vertical and horizontal scope are substitutes 
with respect to productivity1.  
Thus, prior studies have analyzed the effect on horizontal breadth of a change in 
vertical depth and the effect on vertical depth of a change in horizontal breadth.  However, 
we believe ours is the first study to go beyond a unidirectional relationship and instead 
analyze the simultaneous interaction between breadth and depth.  This more accurately 
reflects the ongoing realities within firms as they must manage and coordinate both vertical 
and horizontal scope.  As such, we can better understand the nuances and trade-offs of 
engaging in these activities and the drivers of these choices, such as managerial capabilities 
and organizational structure.  
Capabilities as drivers of scope choices 
 
To unpack the relationship between horizontal breadth and vertical depth decisions, 
we start by focusing on the capabilities possessed by the firm. Consistent with explanations 
offered by the resource-based view, an important driver of horizontal breadth involves the 
utilization of excess indivisible resources or capabilities to expand into multiple products and 
obtain scope economies (Panzar & Willig, 1981; Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1982; Wan et al., 
2011).  The literature on vertical integration has also shown that firms are more likely to 
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integrate if they possess stronger capabilities than external suppliers to efficiently undertake 
upstream or downstream activities (Argyres, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992)2.  
Generally, the resources and capabilities that provide the foundation for horizontal 
and vertical scope decisions differ. Horizontal breadth is enabled by the ability of the firm to 
leverage capabilities that can be applied to different types of products or markets, whereas 
vertical depth is enabled by the ability of the firm to leverage capabilities across different 
stages of the value chain. Capabilities leveraged across horizontal domains are typically 
related to marketing skills, such as product knowledge, sales, branding, reputation and 
customer service (Vorhies et al., 2009), and skills to manage demand complementarities in 
customers and markets (Li & Greenwood, 2004; Tanriverdi & Lee, 2008). The literature 
shows that experience and capabilities in a specific product or project can be helpful in 
related activities (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000; Tanriverdi & Venkatraman, 2005).  On the 
other hand, capabilities involving vertical integration tend to be associated with production 
and process expertise, such as technology selection, asset utilization, risk reduction, and 
supply chain management (Perry, 1989; Teece & Pisano, 1994).  These capabilities also 
include skills related to managing interdependent stages, since the value chain typically 
involves sequential or reciprocal activities, requiring smooth transitions (Eccles, 1981). 
The dedicated nature of capabilities for horizontal breadth and vertical depth is not 
absolute, as some capabilities are more fungible than others. Fungibility is an attribute of a 
capability that facilitates its application to different organizational and market settings 
(Levinthal & Wu, 2010). Few, if any, capabilities are perfectly fungible, but we would expect 
greater fungibility in more closely related applications (Maritan & Lee, 2017). If the firm’s 
horizontal capabilities are more easily devoted to other product markets rather than to vertical 
activities, that means they have greater within-scope than across-scope fungibility.  Likewise, 
if vertical capabilities are more easily devoted to other vertical stages than to product 
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markets, then they would also have greater within-scope than across-scope fungibility. We 
posit that, due to key differences in horizontal and vertical capabilities, within-scope 
fungibility will tend to be greater than across-scope fungibility.  When within-scope 
fungibility is greater than across-scope fungibility, the choices of horizontal or vertical scope 
driven by capabilities will be independent.  
A corollary of this fungibility assumption within and across scopes is that to obtain 
interdependency, something additional is required.  This simplifies the theoretical and 
empirical analysis, as these new additional drivers can be studied without the complication of 
any cross-effects of scope-specific capabilities (e.g., horizontal capabilities affecting vertical 
depth). We propose that a crucial driver of breadth and depth interdependence are higher-
order capabilities that involve top managers, which we term executive capabilities.  
Executive capabilities and scope  
Firms’ executive capabilities, that is the ability of the top management team to 
administer, orchestrate, and coordinate the entire set of firm activities, can generate an 
interdependency between horizontal breadth and vertical depth, since they impact the overall 
management of the firm.  These capabilities relate to the ability to broadly manage the firm, 
that is, to plan, execute and monitor firm activities. These capabilities include resource 
orchestration and parenting skills, involving the ability to make decisions to expand, allocate, 
and redeploy resources across businesses and activities (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Helfat & 
Martin, 2015; Sirmon et al., 2011). These executive capabilities are used to manage activities 
executed across scopes, as well as to guide the firm more broadly. The strategy literature has 
highlighted the relevance of the higher-order managerial skills, which usually reside at the 
top of the organization (Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella, 2009; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). 
Executive capabilities are more general than scope-specific capabilities, so they can 
be applied to managing and coordinating different activities. However, executive capabilities 
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are not scale-free; their value diminishes with the magnitude of the operations and activities 
to which they are applied. This generates opportunity costs in their deployment, and thus their 
allocation to different activities becomes relevant and highly consequential to performance 
(Levinthal & Wu, 2010).  
We focus on two sources that generate the non-scale free nature of these executive 
capabilities (Zenger, Felin, & Bigelow, 2011). First, information problems become more 
prevalent when scale increases, as information that is passed on from operations to 
management can be distorted. This happens unintentionally, as a by-product of passing the 
information across more layers (Williamson, 1985), or intentionally, when information is 
misrepresented and/or withheld due to delegation in larger organizations (Gibbons, 
Matouschek, & Roberts, 2013).  In addition to information distortion, information processing 
also suffers with scale. As organizations grow larger or more complex, the amount of 
information that needs to be processed by managers increases. However, managers’ 
information processing capability is limited (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Radner, 1992) and the 
amount and distortion of information affects the cognitive capability of managers, one subset 
of executive capability. Helfat and Peteraf (p. 835, 2015) defined cognitive capability as “the 
capacity of an individual manager to perform one or more of the mental activities that 
comprise cognition”. They posit that this capability has an important context- or domain-
specific aspect. Given limits to managers’ cognition, managers tend toward inertia and 
similar decision-making processes based upon the context (Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; Shepard, 
McMullen & Ocasio, 2017). Thus, as a firm gains experience in a particular set of dominant 
activities or capabilities, managers accumulate knowledge in that particular domain, 
specializing their cognition and increasing the difficulty to optimally addressing other 
activities or capability sets that the firm might decide to pursue.  
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Another source of non-scalability of executive capabilities is related to moral hazard 
and effort. When organizations grow larger, monitoring and incentivizing effort become more 
difficult. Even if information is not distorted and managers would have infinite processing 
capability, the amount and complexity of activities still generates the problem of imperfect 
observability and divergence of objectives between workers and the firm (Canback, Samouel, 
& Price, 2006; McAfee and McMillan, 1995; Zenger, 1994).  
Being both broad and deep will highly tax executive capabilities available to the firm. 
This claim on capabilities may not be overly costly if the firm is not burdened with other 
demands. However, if the company’s management is already close to full capacity-utilization, 
then the effectiveness of executive capabilities will become impaired.  Managers will be 
cognitively taxed and monitoring employees will become harder to accomplish.  In turn, this 
will generate pressure to offload activities to reduce firm scope.  Since executive capability is 
domain-specific, they likely will reduce activities in the more “different” area, suggesting a 
negative relationship between breadth and depth3.   Although hiring more top managers can 
somewhat mitigate this problem, it is costly and lumpy to increase the size of the executive 
team, it does not fully address the information problems, and team size is affected by 
diseconomies of scale driven by communication distortions and bureaucratic insularity 
(Canback, et al., 2006; Williamson, 1967). Therefore, when executive capabilities are taxed, 
for example by greater coordination demands, a trade-off between breadth and depth can 
result. For instance, in project-based industries, the number of projects and their diversity will 
increase coordination demands due to information problems arising from activities that are 
time-dependent, challenging to plan, and hard to monitor.   
To summarize, when coordination demands are modest, top managers can handle both 
horizontal and vertical activities, such that these will be independent.  However, as these 
demands increase, executive capabilities become taxed and less effective.  To cope with the 
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constraints imposed by activity in one direction, firms will have the incentive to free-up 
executive capability by reducing the scope in the other direction.   That is, we predict a 
negative relationship between breadth and depth when these coordination demands are high.  
The overall argument we have laid out is symmetric – a bi-directional, simultaneous 
interdependency between breadth and depth.  However, we use two hypotheses to explicitly 
differentiate the direction of influence and to test if the effect might be more powerful in one 
direction than the other.  
H1a: When the coordination demands on executive capabilities are high, an increase 
(decrease) in the horizontal breadth will cause a decrease (increase) in the vertical depth 
of the firm. This negative relationship will increase in strength as these coordination 
demands increase. 
H1b: When the coordination demands on executive capabilities are high, an increase 
(decrease) in the vertical depth will cause a decrease (increase) in the horizontal breadth 
of the firm. This negative relationship will increase in strength as these coordination 
demands increase. 
Organizational structure and the trade-off between horizontal breadth and vertical depth 
In this section, we explicitly include transaction cost economics (TCE) as it applies to the 
trade-off between horizontal breadth and vertical depth. TCE focuses on the ex-post 
adaptation problem in transactions, under conditions of contract incompleteness and self-
interested behavior. Gibbons (2005) recognizes that TCE comes in two streams. First and 
most commonly employed, asset specificity can yield ex-post opportunistic behavior by 
exchanging parties in order to appropriate quasi-rents; to avoid inefficient hold-up, common 
ownership and the use of authority are recommended (Williamson, 1985; 1979).  Second, 
even in the absence of asset specificity, frictions, interdependencies and coordination 
problems will ensue in the contract execution stage, which can lead to costly haggling, 
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renegotiations and inefficient adaptation (Williamson, 1975). In these settings, adaptation to 
changing circumstances and unexpected events (e.g., redefining routines, reacting to 
disruptions, apportioning responsibilities, etc.) and the ability to manage interdependencies 
are major organizational challenges. 
The use of a centralized structure and authority allows the firm to manage 
interdependencies and facilitate adaptation to changing circumstances and events (e.g., 
Williamson, 1975; 1991; 1996). A mechanism to create a common authority and improve 
adaptation is centralization of decision-making processes, which can be done through a more 
centralized structure and integration of key functions.  A centralized structure enhances 
coordinated decision making among activities when a careful attention to interdependencies 
and changing events is required (McElheran, 2014; Argyres and Silverman, 2004), whereas 
integrating key functions provides a solution to frequent and unexpected adaptation problems 
through a common authority which facilitates coordination (Williamson, 1975; Tadelis and 
Williamson, 2013).  
Inspired by the coordination problems in construction projects, Tadelis (2002 and 2009) 
predicted that an increase in ex post adaptation caused by a higher number and more complex 
set of tasks and activities leads to greater integration due to the need for fiat and coordination 
of activities. Forbes and Lederman (2009) provide empirical evidence, showing that major 
airlines are more likely to use owned regionals (rather than independent regional carriers) on 
routes that have adverse weather with more disruptions that need to be coordinated. Tadelis 
and Williamson (2013) summarized recent developments in TCE, returning to the early 
emphasis on integration as a solution to frequent and unexpected ex-post adaptation. 
We take this perspective and suggest that, by enabling managers to use authority and fiat 
in the decision-making process, organizational structures facilitating centralized decision-
making should reduce the strength of the trade-off between breadth and depth.  Regarding 
Can firms be both broad and deep? 14 
breadth, when expanding into new products, segments or industries, functional areas such as 
sales, marketing, and product design will display more frictions and inconsistencies, and 
these functions will coordinate more effectively if central authority is granted. For example, 
marketing campaigns require higher coordination and alignment when they involve more 
products or customer segments. The same occurs with upstream or downstream activities in 
the value chain. Given that these activities display frictions and interdependencies, 
integrating them within the same firm provides the benefit of centralizing key coordinating 
functions, such as quality control, procurement, and production planning, increases.  
This logic is consistent with prior work that links related diversification to structures with 
higher functional centralization (Hill & Hoskisson, 1987; Guadalupe et al 2013; Collis et al 
2007), and with recent empirical evidence that suggests a positive relationship between 
centralization and vertical integration (Arora, Belenzon, & Rios, 2014; Weigelt & Miller, 
2013; Brahm and Tarzijan, 2016). It also aligns with the notion of the firm as a “coordination 
device”, implying that internal hierarchy is superior to the market to coordinate activities  
(Langlois & Robertson, 1993; Okyhusen & Bechky, 2009; Puranam & Srikanth, 2014).  
Thus, we propose the following two hypotheses: 
H2a: When the coordination demands on executive capabilities are high, centralization 
lowers the negative impact that an increase in the horizontal breadth causes on the 
vertical depth of the firm.  
H2b: When the coordination demands on executive capabilities are high, centralization 
lowers the negative impact that an increase in the vertical depth causes on the horizontal 
breadth of the firm.  
 
Our theoretical framework and hypotheses are summarized in Figure 1. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Insert Figure 1 about here 
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-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 EMPIRICAL SETTING 
We test the hypotheses of this study within the context of the Chilean construction 
industry, focusing our attention on contractors, who build multiple residential or commercial 
projects. These projects tend to be varied with heterogeneity in design, specifications, 
geographic location, size, and other attributes. Typically, a contractor creates a project for an 
owner/developer according to the specifications provided by the architect or designer.  
Projects are the “production units” for contractors. They assign resources to projects, control 
and monitor performance, and coordinate administrative tasks, such as procurement, logistics, 
warehousing and staffing across projects.  The contractor’s managerial team spends an 
important part of its time coordinating and overseeing the project portfolio.   
We have detailed information about all relevant project types: housing complexes, 
office buildings, residential buildings, health facilities, educational facilities, hotels, industrial 
buildings, commercial projects (e.g., banks or supermarkets), religious buildings, and single-
family houses.  Horizontally, diversification of contractors increases with the type of projects 
they undertake.  For each project, we also have detailed information regarding the 
contractors’ sourcing decisions for nine distinct specialty trade activities: 1) building and 
installing the metallic structure, 2) building the formwork, 3) installing electrical services, 4) 
installing plumbing and water services, 5) installing heating and cooling systems, 6) framing 
and installing windows, 7) painting, 8) installing gas services, and 9) building and installing 
furnishings and appliances. These activities account for the vast majority of building project 
activities (Riley, Varadan, James, & Thomas, 2005) and each requires a considerable amount 
of specific expertise (Ng & Tang, 2010).  The greater the number of vertical activities 
performed by the contractor, aggregated over its total project portfolio, the deeper its depth.  
Can firms be both broad and deep? 16 
Because we study a single industry with clearly defined and observable horizontal and 
vertical activities, we can distinguish which capabilities are more prone to horizontal or 
vertical activities and which ones are useful for both types of activities. In addition, this 
industry provides plenty of variation in terms of breadth and depth of contractors: some are 
vertically deep but horizontally narrow, some are vertically shallow and horizontally wide, 
and others are either “deep and wide” or “shallow and narrow”.  
DATA AND VARIABLES 
We used a unique database provided by ONDAC S.A. This firm collects detailed data 
on construction projects and sells this data to construction suppliers and building material 
manufacturers. The database covers the period from January 2004 to October 2012 and 
includes 46,420,398 square meters built in 12,272 projects. The database covers 
approximately 40% of the total square meters constructed in Chile during that period. We had 
to compute lags on some variables, thus losing the first four years in our database. Our final 
sample included 355 contractors, with an average of three years of data per contractor.  
The primary unit of analysis in our estimation is the firm-year. The firm (contractor) 
is a collection of projects. For each project, detailed information about the contractor was 
available (i.e., executives’ names and the contractor’s website, address and company name). 
In addition, for each project we obtained relevant data, such as size in square meters, 
geographic location (state, city), starting and ending dates, stage of construction, detailed 
comments regarding project characteristics, and sourcing data on the nine specialty trade 
activities. To obtain firm-year information, we used the start date of the project to aggregate 
the collection of projects into a firm-year panel data structure.   
Variable measurement 
Dependent variables. We have two dependent variables, one measuring the 
contractor’s breadth of project types and another measuring their depth of vertical activities. 
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Breadth of horizontal portfolio. We measure horizontal breadth by the degree of 
diversification based on the ten types of projects, which we calculate annually using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). To compute the HHI, we first calculate the share of the 
total square meters built by the contractor for each project type and then sum the squares of 
these shares; since the HHI reflects concentration, we then take 1-HHI to create a final 
variable to measure horizontal breadth 4. 
Depth of vertical activities. To measure the vertical depth we aggregated, at the 
contractor-year level, all the sourcing choices made in the different specialty trades in all the 
different projects. First, each of the nine activities took the value of 1 if integrated and 0 if 
outsourced. Second, across all contractors, we standardized this measure for each activity5. 
Then, we averaged the standardized measure across activities for each contractor and each 
year. This results in a vertical depth measure that is equal to the standardized percentage of 
integrated specialty trade activities at the contractor level. 
Independent variables. We have four sets of independent variables. The first set 
measures capabilities that are specific to the horizontal breadth; the second sets measures 
capabilities and transaction hazards that are specific to the vertical depth. The third set is 
comprised of variables that proxy for coordination demands while the fourth set of 
independent variables is used to capture centralization of decision making. 
Horizontal capabilities. The experiences of project designers and administrators are 
important capabilities for contractors, which we measure as follows: 
Designer experience in different project types. To measure designer experience, we 
first compute the diversification level of each designer across different project types, using 
the formula of one minus the HHI index. We calculate the HHI index as the sum of the 
squares of the percentages of the designer’s square meters built in each type of project. This 
Can firms be both broad and deep? 18 
generates a measure of experience across project types for each designer. For each contractor, 
we compute the average diversification of designers used in projects started in that year.  
Project director experience in different project types.  Project directors are an 
important resource for contractors, since they lead on-site project execution. We compute 
experience across project types for each director by adding a dummy variable with a value of 
1 if the director had been involved with more than one project type over the last three years 
and 0 otherwise6. For each contractor-year, we compute an average such that the resulting 
measure reflects the percentage of a contractor’s project directors with broader experience. 
We chose this option instead of an HHI index because only 20% of the directors had 
experience in more than one project type.  
Vertical capabilities and transaction hazards. We use three measures to capture 
expertise, transaction hazards, and supplier relationships.  
Trade expertise. This variable is associated with experience and know-how in each 
vertical activity. There is a substantial literature that shows that greater trade expertise and 
capability in executing upstream activities drives greater integration (Jacobides & Winter, 
2005; Mayer & Salomon, 2006). For each specialty trade activity within each region, we 
compute the total historical volume (in square meters) conducted by the contractor and by all 
subcontractors in that specific trade. To capture the notion of comparative capabilities 
(Jacobides & Hitt, 2005), we then compute the volume percentile for the focal contractor, 
considering the total volume for each activity in periods t-4 to t-1, omitting year t to avoid 
reverse causality. Then, we average these percentiles across specialty trades to obtain a 
contractor-year measure of overall vertical trade expertise. In simple terms, we rank all the 
“players” in a specific trade using previous volume, both by subcontractors and the internal 
teams, and then obtain the percentile at which the internal team of each contractor is placed. 
Then, we average across trades7. 
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Prior interactions with suppliers. Prior interactions with suppliers engenders 
goodwill, decreasing the risk of opportunistic behavior and thus increasing the likelihood of 
outsourcing, as well as improving coordination and contracting (Gulati & Nickerson, 2008; 
Mayer & Argyres, 2004). We measure the number of interactions between each pair of 
contractors and suppliers prior to the focal firm-year. For each trade activity and region, we 
created adjacency matrices between contractors and suppliers to obtain the number of 
projects each contractor executed with each supplier over the prior four years (from t-1 to t-
4).  If the contractor had no prior projects with a supplier in a particular trade activity, we set 
this variable to zero. To obtain a measure at the contractor-year level, we average across 
regions and specialty trades the repeated interactions for each contractor-year.  
Thinness of supplier market. This variable captures the transaction hazards that are 
generated by the small numbers problem (Williamson, 1975). In construction, suppliers 
specialize geographically and by project type (Ball, 2003; Somerville, 1999).  Thus, we 
measure supplier market thinness using the market concentration of firms in each specialty 
trade activity for each project type by region using the HHI. A high HHI indicates that a few 
suppliers dominate, increasing their bargaining power and promoting vertical integration. The 
HHI measure was computed for a two-year window. For an aggregate measure for each 
contractor-year, we average the HHI index across trades by region and compute a weighted 
average for each contractor based upon their total square meters built in each region8.  
Coordination demands. We use three measures for coordination demands.  
Number of projects. The number of projects that a contractor is simultaneously 
managing affects the managers’ ability to efficiently manage and coordinate each project. 
More projects imply more transitions within and between projects and more difficulties in 
allocating resources and transmitting and processing information. In specialty trades, this 
involves more handovers between trades, with scheduling and quality control challenges. 
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(O’Brien & Fisher, 2000). In terms of horizontal breadth, more projects implies more 
complex allocation of selling and service ability, price planning across projects, and more 
design iterations due to sharing specifications. We computed the number of projects started in 
each year to measure each contractor’s number of projects. Since projects typically last over a 
year, this measure captures the simultaneous contractor’s project load. 
Project distance to headquarters. In construction, project oversight and coordination 
is largely done on-site due to project specificities and the need for more accurate information 
(Navon & Sacks, 2007). Therefore, the distance of each project to the contractor’s 
headquarters might affect coordination within and between projects. For each contractor, we 
observe the county location for the headquarters and the specific location of each project.  
Using the latitude and longitude coordinates, we compute the distance between each project 
to headquarters for each year, then take an average and convert this figure to its natural 
logarithm by adding one (logarithm of zero is undefined; see Kalnins, 2003).  
Distance between projects. Coordination among geographically distant projects is 
difficult, particularly for allocating resources between projects and generating common 
understandings in terms of procedures, administrative processes and informal rules. In the 
specialty trades, distance between projects increases coordination needs for timing across 
projects, more difficult adaptation and travel time for personnel, and differing specifications 
due to local rules and conditions. In terms of horizontal breadth, greater distance increases 
coordination demands since it increases customer heterogeneity and custom specifications, as 
well as complicates service personnel allocation.  To estimate the distance between projects, 
we compute the geographic centroid of the contractor’s set of projects by year. The centroid 
is the latitude and longitude that minimizes the weighted distance of the projects, using 
project size in square meters as the weights.  We compute the average distance of the projects 
to this centroid, transforming this to its natural logarithm by adding one. 
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Centralization of decision-making. We measure centralization using two variables, 
procurement centralization and design integration. The former facilitates centralized 
coordination across the vertical tasks (i.e., specialty trades), whereas the latter facilitates 
centralized coordination across horizontal tasks.  
Procurement centralization. Materials procurement is a critical activity in 
construction, as materials represent 50% of project costs and their timing is important for 
scheduling and productivity.  Material procurement involves many tasks such as soliciting 
bids, bargaining long-term deals, co-designing custom-made items, coordinating deliveries, 
controlling quality and managing storage. Contractors buy the majority of materials and this 
activity can be centralized at headquarters, who aggregate the requirements, or delegated to 
the project, where each project manager procures independently. Centralization can facilitate 
the coordinated adaptation between the specialty trades as it facilitates smoother allocations 
and better timing of materials to each project (Bashford et al, 2003).  It can also improve the 
knowledge sharing across projects and provide centralized quality control (Ellegaard & Koch, 
2004).  For each project, we coded a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when 
procurement is centralized, and zero in case of delegation. Then, we aggregated this variable 
by computing its mean at the contractor-year level. 
Design integration. For each project, we observe whether the design is done by internal 
designers or outsourced to an external firm. In-house design allows for better adaptation and 
coordination over multiple and distant projects. More projects, and more distant projects, 
increase heterogeneity in design and specifications. This heterogeneity affects contractors’ 
horizontal tasks, such as budgeting, pricing, and marketing, all of which require adaptation to 
the different projects and coordination to avoid inconsistencies.  For each project, we 
computed a variable with the value of 1 if design is integrated and zero if it is outsourced. 
Then, we aggregated this variable by computing its mean at the contractor-year level. 
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Control variables. We include control variables at various levels. For contractors, we 
include size, market share, geographic dispersion, metropolitan focus, and housing sector 
focus. At the market level, we include project type uncertainty, demand imbalance, and 
market size. We also include year fixed effects to control for average changes in scope over 
time. See our appendix for a summary of our controls.  Table 1 provides descriptive statistics 
and correlations for our dataset.  
------------------------------- 
 Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The appropriate econometric strategy to address our question must incorporate the 
interdependency between horizontal breadth and vertical depth. To do so, we use the 
following simultaneous equation model at the firm-year level: 
Breadth_Horit = 0 + 1 x Depth_Verit + 1 x Hor_Capit  + Controls + t +i + it                      (1) 
Depth_Verit = 0 + 1 x Breadth_Horit + 2 x Vert_Cap&TransHazit  + Controls + t' + ' + it   (2) 
 In equation (1), the breadth of the horizontal portfolio of contractor i in year t 
(Breadth_Horit) is modeled as a function of the depth of vertical activities (Depth_Verit), 
horizontal capabilities (Hor_Capit) (i.e., designer and project manager experience), control 
variables, and time effects. In equation (2), the depth of vertical activities of the contractor i 
in year t is modeled as a function of the breadth of the horizontal portfolio, vertical 
capabilities and transactional hazards (Vert_Cap&TransHazit) (i.e., trade expertise, prior 
interactions and market thinness), a set of control variables, and time effects. The terms i are 
estimated using random-effects. Random effect models combine within-firm and between-
firm variation to compute the coefficients. 
The coefficients 1 and 1 are prone to endogeneity bias driven by reverse causality 
(i.e., the vertical depth affects the horizontal breadth and vice-versa) and by potential omitted 
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variable bias. To correct for these biases, we use an instrumental variable (IV) technique 
(Bascle, 2008). This procedure requires an estimation of endogenous variables using 
instruments that are both valid and strong (Murray, 2006). The ideal candidates for 
instruments in our setting are the sets of variables that drive vertical depth in equation (2) and 
those that drive horizontal breadth in equation (1), because these are specific to each 
boundary choice (strength condition) and do not affect the other decision (validity condition).  
In Equation (1), we instrument Depth_Vertit using Vert_Cap&Trans_Hazit . This 
variable is not present in equation (1), satisfying (in principle) the validity condition and is 
present in equation (2), satisfying (in principle) the strength condition. Analogously, we use 
the instrument of Hor_Capit for Breadth_Horit in equation 2. As it is shown below, the tests 
recommended by Bascle (2008) confirm the validity and strength of our instruments (i.e., 
Hansen test). Having two instruments for horizontal breadth and three for vertical depth 
allows a local average treatment effect closer to the average treatment effect. 
In Table 2, we present the results of the estimations that test the baseline relationship 
between breadth and depth.  Model 1 does not include the instrumental variables and is 
presented only as a naïve, baseline random effects model9. The results of this model support 
our drivers of horizontal depth in that greater designer experience across project types and 
broader project manager experience are both associated with a greater breadth in the 
horizontal project portfolio.  Also, more trade expertise, fewer interactions with suppliers, 
and thin supplier markets are all associated with greater vertical depth, as expected.  This 
provides support for using these sets of variables as instruments.    
In Model 2, we present the instrumental variable (IV) estimation, which fully 
conforms to our theoretical model. This and the remaining models are estimated using the 
XTIVREG2 command in the STATA package. To evaluate the validity and strength 
assumptions of our instruments we evaluated the F-test of the first stage and computed the 
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Hansen test (Bascle, 2008). The F-test shows that the instruments have strength (i.e., they 
explain the endogenous term), surpassing the threshold proposed by Stock and Yogo (2002). 
Moreover, the Hansen test indicates that our instruments are valid (i.e., they do not explain 
the dependent variable, conditional on covariates). This is in line with our contention that 
horizontal and vertical capabilities are scope-specific. These results indicate that we are 
effectively testing how scope changes generated by capabilities affect each other.  
Part of the justification for the exogeneity of the instruments was the use of lags in the 
measurement of capabilities, particularly for project director experience, supplier expertise 
and prior interactions. However, if breadth and depth are persistent, lagging might not be 
enough. In order to address this concern, we included in Model 1 lagged measures for breath 
and depth as controls (for t-1, t-2 and t-3). Results, which are available from the authors upon 
request, do not change. This provides additional confidence on the empirical strategy10.  
The main results of Model 2 indicate the changes in breadth and depth generated by 
capabilities are independent. This agrees with our baseline assumption. Capabilities at each 
scope are distinct and uniquely influence its own scope. When no other constraint is present, 
the firm does not need to trade-off breadth and depth. 
------------------------------- 
 Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
The role of coordination demands 
To explore Hypotheses 1 and 2, we add the interaction effects of the coordination 
variables, using the following equations:  
 Breadth_Hor it = 0 + 1 x Depth_Ver it + 2 x Hor_Capit   
+  3 x Depth_Verit x Coord_Demandsit + Controls + t  + it        (3) 
 
Depth_Verit = 0 + 1 x Breadth_Horit + 2 x Vert_Cap&Trans_Hazit    
+  3 x Breadth_Horit x Coord_Demandsit  + Controls + t  + it      (4) 
 
Can firms be both broad and deep? 25 
Equation (3) is identical to equation (1), except for the inclusion of the interaction 
term between vertical depth and coordination demands (Coord_Demandsit). The same applies 
for equations (2) and (4), which include the interaction term between horizontal breadth and 
coordination demands. The individual term for coordination demands is included in the 
controls. The coefficients 3 and 3 must be evaluated to gauge support for Hypotheses 1a 
and 1b. To correct for the potential endogeneity problem of interaction terms, we use the 
technique suggested by Wooldridge (2002: 236-237)11.  
The results are displayed in Table 3. Again, for all models, the Hansen test and the F-
test of the first stage indicate that our instruments are valid and strong. In Models 3, 4 and 5 
we introduce the interaction terms for each type of coordination demand. In Model 3, we 
include the interaction with the number of projects. The results show that the interaction 
terms are negative and statistically significant. Figure 2 shows that a one standard deviation 
increase in vertical depth is associated with a decrease of a quarter of a standard deviation in 
horizontal breadth when the number of projects is large (defined as one standard deviation 
above the mean). In contrast, when the number of projects is low, vertical depth has little 
effect on horizontal breadth. Figure 3 shows that a one standard deviation increase in 
horizontal breadth decreases vertical depth by a third of a standard deviation only when the 
number of projects is large, but the effect is much smaller when this number is low. In Model 
4, we include the interaction terms with the distance to headquarters, whose coefficients are 
negative but not statistically significant. In Model 5, we include the interaction terms with the 
distance between projects, whose coefficients are negative and statistically significant. These 
results, displayed in Figures 4 and 5, indicate that a one standard deviation increase in 
vertical depth (horizontal breadth) decreases horizontal breadth (vertical depth) by a quarter 
(third) of a standard deviation12.  
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Overall, our results support the prediction that coordination demands lead to higher 
integration. All coefficients have the expected sign, and only those associated with the 
distance to headquarters are not statistically significant. It is likely that the distance to 
headquarters also captures the cost of monitoring, which in this industry has to be largely 
performed on site (Navon & Sacks, 2007).  Also, while the number of projects and the 
distance between projects capture coordination difficulties between projects, distance to 
headquarters captures coordination problems within projects. Whereas the former can be a 
task for a high-level manager, the second can be delegated to a project director. Delegation 
would reduce the daily demands on high level managers, and thus mute the interactions 
estimated in Models 4a and 4b of Table 3. 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Insert Table 3 and Figures 2, 3, 4, and 5 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Our random effects analysis lumps together within and between variance. Given that 
coefficients may vary across levels, and following the suggestions by Certo et al (2016), we 
studied the intraclass correlation coefficients and compared the random effects models with 
their fixed effects counterparts (results available upon request). In general, we found that 
fixed effects models yield very similar results to those displayed in Tables 2 and 3. This is 
particularly the case for the interaction coefficients of Table 3. Hausman tests confirmed the 
reasonability of random effects models. Besides discarding theoretical differences across 
levels, this shows that time invariant unobservables do not alter our results significantly. 
Notwithstanding, the coefficients in the regression explaining Depth Vert, particularly trade 
expertise and prior interactions, decreased somewhat in their size and significance, mainly 
because of the low within firm variance in vertical scope.  
As a robustness test, we also checked whether contractor market share could be 
driving vertical depth through its effects on horizontal breadth (e.g., market share may 
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increase market power with suppliers, decreasing vertical depth), and found no support. We 
also replaced the number of projects with contractor size and obtained consistent results.  
Overall, our results show that the interdependency of vertical depth and horizontal depth 
exists only when coordination demands are high, supporting Hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
Centralization of decision making reduces the impact of coordination demands 
To study the role of hierarchical adaptation on the trade-off between breadth and 
depth, we use the following model: 
Breadth_Horit = 0 + 1  x Depth_Verit + 2 x Hor_Capit   
   + 3 x Depth_Verit x Coord_Demandsit + 4 x Depth_Verit x Centit    
   + 5 x Coord_Demandsit x Centit + 6 x Depth_Verit x Coord_Demandsit x Centit   
   + Controls + t + it                                                (5) 
 
Depth_Verit = 0 + 1 x Breadth_Horit + 2 x Vert_Cap&Trans_Hazit   
   + 3 x Breadth_Horit x Coord_Demandsit + 4 x Breadth_Horit x Centit 
   + 5 x Centit x Coord_Demandsit + 6 x Breadth_Horit x Coord_Demandsit x Centit  
   + Controls + t + it                                  (6) 
 
In these models, we add to equations (3) and (4) the interactions with the 
centralization variables (Centit), that is, procurement centralization and design integration. 
According to TCE, centralization facilitates the handling of high coordination demands, 
which should lead to positive coefficients for 6 and 6. 
In Table 4 we present the results for centralization of procurement. Models 6a and 6b 
study the interaction with number of projects. In Model 6a we do not find significant results, 
whereas in Model 6b we find a positive and highly statistically significant coefficient for the 
triple interaction (6). Given the large variance inflation factor of 6 (equal to 13) we gauge 
its statistical significance using a joint t-test, finding that the first derivative of vertical depth 
over horizontal breadth and the second derivative of depth over breadth and number of 
projects are highly significant. In Figure 6 we display graphically the derivative 
d(depth)/d(breadth). The magnitude of the effect is large. When centralization is 0%, moving 
from “mean – 1 standard deviation (SD)” to “mean + 1 SD” in the number of projects implies 
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a reduction of 0.45 SD in depth after an increase of 1 SD in breadth (moving along the top 
edge of the surface of Figure 6). If centralization is 100%, then the same reduction in the 
number of projects implies a reduction of 0.05 SD in depth after an increase of 1 SD in 
breadth (moving along the opposite edge of the surface of Figure 6). This is consistent with 
our theory: the presence (absence) of centralization mitigates (exacerbates) the trade-off 
imposed on depth by an increase in breadth under conditions of high coordination demands.  
In Models 7a and 7b we study the interaction with distance between projects. The 
results are very similar to those of Model 6; we find statistically significant results in 7b but 
not in 7a. In Figure 7, we display the derivative d(depth)/d(breadth). The magnitudes are 
again large. If centralization is equal to 0%, moving from “mean – 1 SD” to “mean + 1 SD” 
in the distance between projects implies a reduction of 0.35 SD in depth after an increase of 1 
SD in breadth. If centralization is 100%, then this reduction is equal to 0.04 SD.  
Not finding results in Models 6a and 7a is expected because procurement 
centralization affects coordination of specialty trades activities; therefore, it should influence 
vertical depth (Models 6b and 7b) and not horizontal breadth (Models 6a and 7a). We believe 
that these expected null results in horizontal scope enhance the credibility of our findings.  
Overall, these results strongly support Hypothesis 2a: centralized decision-making 
mitigates the negative trade-off between breadth and depth that arises when coordination 
demands are high. In our setting, the centralization of procurement facilitates adaptation 
between materials’ procurement and specialty trades and resolves coordination frictions 
across projects such as those due to personnel allocation and quality control.   
Table 5 displays the results using design integration. In Model 8a we find significant 
results. In Figure 8 we display graphically the derivative d(breadth)/d(depth). If design 
integration is equal to 0%, moving from “mean – 1 SD” to “mean + 1 SD” in the number of 
projects means a reduction of 0.30 SD in breadth after an increase of 1 SD in depth. If design 
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integration is 100%, this effect is equal to a breadth increase of 0.05 SD. As expected, we do 
not find significant results in Model 8b: design integration affects the coordination of 
horizontal activities (e.g., budgeting, costing, pricing, bidding), not vertical ones. These 
results are supportive of Hypothesis 2b: centralization of decision making mitigates the trade-
off imposed on breadth by a higher depth.  In this case, design integration facilitates the 
coordination across projects that top managers have to execute on the horizontal tasks such as 
budgeting, costing, pricing, bidding, communication, marketing and selling, all of which have 
design as a crucial input. With many projects and increased depth, if design integration is not 
present, then coordination using the market interface becomes more difficult, forcing the firm 
to narrow down horizontally. 
In Models 9a and 9b, we repeat the analysis using “distance between projects”, failing 
to find significant results. It could be that the heterogeneity in projects and the changes in 
design and associated coordination issues increase more with the number of projects than 
with the distance between them. 
In sum, we found that design integration mitigates the negative trade-off between 
depth and breadth when there is a high number of projects, but not when there is an 
increasing distance between projects.  
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Insert Tables 4 and 5 and Figures 6, 7 and 8 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Robustness checks 
In addition to the checks above, we conducted three other robustness checks. 
Proxy of managerial diseconomies. To check that constrained executive capabilities, that is 
managerial diseconomies, is the mechanism driving our results, we use data on the 
contractor’s top management team (TMT).  We looked at the number of unique individuals 
occupying four TMT positions -- Chief Executive Officer, Chief Commercial Officer, Head 
of Budgeting, and Head of Procurement. Many contractors do not have an exclusive person 
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filling each role.  All else equal, if there are fewer than four people filling these roles, they 
will be more time-constrained and occupied.   Based on 2012 data, we found the average 
number of unique names to be 2.92 with a standard deviation of 0.86.   To measure 
managerial constraints, we divided the number of TMT unique members by the number of 
projects and replicated our analysis. If our previous results are truly driven by managerial 
diseconomies, they should become stronger when we divide them by the number of TMT 
members since measurement error would lead to a downward bias in coefficients.  
Results are presented in Table 6. Model 10 estimates equations 3 and 4. Model 10a 
replicates Model 4a of Table 4. The coefficient of -0.089 for the interaction with projects per 
TMT member is 4.7 times the coefficient of -0.019 obtained for the interaction with number 
of projects. The coefficient of projects per TMT member is a scaled coefficient of the number 
of projects. Given that the mean of TMT members is 2.92, the size of the impact of 
managerial diseconomies has increased by 62% (4.7 divided by 2.92 minus 1). Model 10b 
replicates Model 4b of Table 4. The coefficient of -0.442 for projects per TMT member is 
now 3.6 times larger than the coefficient for the number of projects. Descaling the 
coefficient, we find that the impact increased by 25% (3.6 divided by 2.9 minus 1). For the 
triple interaction, results are similar. In Model 11a the results are not significant, as in Model 
6a of Table 5. Model 11b replicates Model 6b of Table 5. The coefficient of 0.588 for the 
triple interaction with projects per TMT member is 3.3 times larger than the coefficient for 
the number of projects. Descaling leads to an increase in the impact of managerial 
diseconomies of 13%. Overall, our results support Hypotheses 1a and 1b as they are 
consistent with managerial diseconomies, that is constrained executive capabilities, being the 
mechanism driving our results. 
------------------------------- 
 Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------- 
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Growth as dependent variable. Another way of testing the interdependency of two variables 
is using some performance outcome as the dependent variable specifying a model of the type: 
outcome = b1 + b2 x vertical scope + b3 x horizontal scope + b4 x vertical scope x horizontal 
scope + controls. If b4 is > 0 (<0) and statistically significant, then there is a complementarity 
(substitutive) relationship. Our data does not include performance measures such as profits or 
costs, but we do observe contractor size and therefore can compute a growth rate. The growth 
rate is positively correlated with market share, an indication that growth generally captures a 
contractor’s competitive advantage and performance. Using growth as our outcome in a fixed 
effects regression, where we also control for the growth trend for each contractor plus its 
previous rate of growth, we find that while each scope is strongly correlated with growth, 
their interaction is not. This is consistent with Model 2 of Table 2. In addition, when we 
analyzed how these results varied with the number of projects, we found that the interaction 
goes from positive with few projects, to negative with many projects. Even though statistical 
significance is not strong in this result, it is consistent with Model 3 in Table 3.  
Corroboration by senior managers. In order to improve our understanding and to help 
confirm the mechanisms driving our results, we also reached out to seven senior executives 
of different contractors. Our correspondence contained a summary of our empirical findings 
without any interpretation regarding the underlying mechanisms. Then we asked the 
executives to respond to two questions regarding our findings: 1) Is this finding consistent 
with what you know of the industry? 2) Why do you think that these patterns arise? We 
obtained six replies, each about three pages long. Given the tenure of our respondents, we 
estimate that collectively these executives have experience in managing over 100 projects. 
Their answers are consistent with our interpretation of the findings, as summarized below.  
-   Differences in capabilities. Managers noted that when companies grow horizontally, they 
tend to use and leverage similar resources and capabilities (e.g., contract management, 
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monitoring, capability to manage teams). A typical example was that the systems to control 
and supervise the management of the different types of projects are the same across project 
types. Executives also mentioned that when firms grow vertically by performing different 
activities, they need different sets of technical capabilities, because many capabilities 
required in one type of vertical activity are different from those required in another activity. 
-   Constraints to breadth and growth. As the number, variety and dispersion of projects 
grows, executives indicated that complexity increases, putting pressure on the ability to 
monitor, control and administer the myriad of contracts, particularly in terms of quality 
control and timing, such as transitioning between tasks and projects. Executives also pointed 
to the key role of top management team cohesion and experience in project success. They 
indicated that when coordination demands increase, it is generally better to give away the 
benefits of internally performing vertical activities in favor of not losing the management 
team capability to supervise and coordinate the many activities to complete a project. For 
firms growing vertically, the opposite is true. In order to increase the number of vertical 
trades performed internally, firms have to free-up capacity by decreasing project variety.  
This confirms our empirical findings that constrained executive capabilities leads to a trade- 
off between breadth and depth. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this study, we explored the interdependencies between horizontal breadth and 
vertical depth, grounding our arguments in the effects of capabilities and coordination, which 
have been widely used to explain firm scope decisions. We theorize and empirically 
demonstrate that the capabilities underlying breadth and depth are scope-specific (i.e., 
vertical capabilities impact depth but not breadth, and horizontal capabilities impact breadth 
but not depth), and therefore, breadth and depth are independent.  But, when executive 
capabilities are constrained due to coordination challenges, we did find a negative 
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interdependency between breadth and depth.  Further, we found that organizational structure 
variables, such as decision centralization, can affect the strength of the mechanism driving 
the interdependency between breadth and depth. Our results, and their underlying 
mechanisms, were further validated by executives with considerable project experience.  
We contribute to a slim literature that has analyzed interdependencies between scope 
choices (Chandler, 1962; Rawley & Simcoe, 2010; Tanriverdi & Lee, 2008; Van 
Biesenbroeck, 2007; Zhou and Wan, 2016). However, we go beyond previous literature by 
studying the simultaneous and bi-directional influence of horizontal breadth and vertical 
depth, by measuring capabilities that are specific to horizontal or vertical scope, by 
considering executive capabilities, and by empirically assessing the effect of organizational 
structure. The analysis of the bidirectionality is important because the interrelationship 
between depth and breadth does not need to be symmetric. Additionally, our novel analysis of 
how internal organizational structure affects the tension between horizontal breath and 
vertical depth provides further insights about the interrelationships between managerial and 
organizational decisions.  Thus, our findings inform how firms manage different scope 
choices and the mechanisms that enable and constrain scope decisions, suggesting potential 
barriers to overcome and modes of organizing if firms want to be both broad and deep.  
Our work provides several theoretical contributions and implications. Through our 
simultaneous analysis of horizontal and vertical choices we hope to contribute to theories of 
the firm as a system of activities, supporting the notion of coherence and interrelatedness 
among firm activities (Porter & Siggelkow, 2008; Teece & Pisano, 1994). By finding that 
coordination is the key factor that limits bi-directional growth, we also contribute to recent 
work that emphasizes the costs of diversification over its synergies (Hashai, 2015; Sakharhov 
& Folta, 2014; Zhou, 2011). Our results also imply that there may be some underlying 
fungible executive capability, such as resource orchestration or parenting skills (Adner & 
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Helfat, 2003; Sirmon et al., 2011), that can enable both breadth and depth, perhaps more 
likely in younger, smaller firms. Extending the work on the co-evolution of capabilities and 
boundaries (Argyres & Zenger, 2012; Brahm and Tarzijan, 2014; Mayer, Somaya, & 
Williamson, 2012), we add the importance of coordination and posit that these skills may also 
co-evolve and be intertwined with scope choices, supporting a coordination-based theory of 
the firm (Kogut & Zander, 1996; Srikanth & Puranam, 2014). Our empirical results regarding 
how the firm´s organizational structure can influence the extent of the trade-off between 
breadth and depth, support the findings of recent studies that show that related (unrelated) 
diversification correlates with higher centralization (delegation) of specific functions 
(Guadalupe et al, 2013; Collis et al, 2007).  It also is consistent with the coordination strand 
of TCE that sees the “firm as a coordination device” (Puranam and Srikanth, 2014). This 
perspective focuses on coordination as the main organizational problem, and suggests that 
firms are better than markets for coordinating certain types of activities and problems.  
Several novel managerial implications emerge from our study. First, the tensions and 
trade-offs between vertical and horizontal growth appear to be real, but arise from 
coordination challenges, not clashes of capabilities. Thus, managers should focus particular 
attention on managing costs of coordination rather than on gaining synergies from shared 
capabilities when considering both horizontal and vertical decisions (Hashai, 2015; 
Sakarahov and Folta, 2014; Zhou 2011). For instance, managers should be conscious of the 
limitations of monitoring far-flung operations and recognize when they are becoming 
constrained in their abilities to administer and coordinate a diverse firm. Second, our results 
show that managers of firms that want to expand both vertically and horizontally should think 
about implementing a more centralized decision-making process, but this may not be 
necessary for firms that do not want to pursue simultaneous expansion. As such, 
centralization can be useful in settings different from the ones traditionally analyzed and 
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should not be determined independently of the horizontal breadth and the vertical depth of the 
firm. Third, our results confirm that tradeoffs are important and that managers should seek 
coherence at the aggregated activity level rather than optimization at the individual activity 
level. More generally, managers should look for coherence among capabilities, horizontal 
breadth, vertical depth and the internal organizational structure of the firm.  
Our study is not devoid of limitations, which we hope stimulate research extensions. 
Construction is a relatively mature, low technology industry with well-established horizontal 
and vertical activities and capability drivers; it would be intriguing to replicate our study in a 
rapidly changing context to see if our results hold. Our setting also considers horizontal breadth 
in the same industry (e.g., different types of construction projects). It would be interesting to 
evaluate what happens with the breadth and depth relationship when horizontal and vertical 
decisions are between-industries rather than within-industries. Although intra-industry 
diversification is more prevalent than inter-industry diversification, it is not obvious what type 
of diversification more strongly affects capability sharing and coordination costs (Zahavie and 
Lavie, 2013). In less related industries, the effect of centralization on relaxing the breadth/depth 
tension may also be different.  Given that our setting considers horizontal breadth in the same 
industry, this could be a boundary condition for our results.  
 Another limitation is that by considering project-based firms, we do not consider the 
case of traditional manufacturing sectors.  In that context, there may be significant gains from 
economies of scale and a difficulty in securing suppliers, which may be more likely to drive a 
positive correlation between horizontal expansion and vertical integration (Chandler, 1962; 
Van Biesebroeck, 2007). Project-based firms typically have relatively thick supply markets, 
perform projects that require a unique combination of inputs that are coordinated on-site, 
involve projects with various stages that use the work of other stages without incorporating 
this work into an intermediate product, and have less significant scale economies (Eccles, 
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1981; Hobday, 2000). Thus, it is possible that the strong impact of coordination is less 
pronounced in contexts where production stages are more independent and/or less temporally 
connected.  In addition, regulations that affect this industry, such as those related to labor and 
subcontracting, vary across countries, and thus studies in other locations and in other sectors 
would be welcomed. The lack of a direct measure of executive capabilities is also a limitation 
of our study but does provide an opportunity for further research. Although in the robustness 
section we did measure executive capabilities more directly using information about the 
TMT, further efforts in this direction will be useful.  
Endogeneity is always an issue when studying organizational matters such as the 
interdependency of scope choices. While we cannot claim that we fully addressed this issue, 
we are confident in the three techniques we used to mitigate this concern. First, we add a set 
of well-behaved instruments that are coherent with the prescriptions of strategic management 
theory (vertical capabilities as instruments for vertical scope and horizontal capabilities as 
instruments for horizontal scope).  Second, we add a wide set of control variables and 
performed multiple robustness checks, which confirmed our results.  Third, we corroborated 
the causal mechanism between our main variables with interviews of senior executives.  
In conclusion, we find that horizontal breadth and vertical depth are independent, until 
coordination demands become significant when we find a negative interdependency.   Thus, 
these dimensions of firm scope should not be addressed or studied in isolation, particularly 
when senior managers become constrained with coordination demands. Moreover, the 
interplay between these decisions cannot be isolated from the analysis of internal 
organizational choices. As strategic management has long recognized, the fit between 
strategic choices is a key determinant of a firm’s competitive advantage (Porter & Siggelkow, 
2008; Teece & Pisano, 1994). Our study indicates that choices of breadth and depth should be 
considered simultaneously and include both scope-specific capabilities, overall executive 
Can firms be both broad and deep? 37 
capability and internal organizational decisions.  In sum, the joint analysis of vertical and 
horizontal scope choices is under-researched, and we hope that our study motivates additional 
work in this important area.   
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ENDNOTES  
1Prior studies that analyzed the relationship between breadth and depth have subtle methodological 
differences. When performance is available, as in Tanriverdi and Lee (2008) or Van Biesebroek 
(2007), complementarity or substitution is studied, that is, the extent to which both variables reinforce 
or hinder one another in the impact they exert on an outcome. When performance is not available, as 
in Rawley and Simcoe (2010), the analysis centers on interdependency -  how one variable directly 
affects the other by using exogenous variation. These two approaches frequently imply one another, 
but they are logically distinct. 
 
2To keep our analysis parsimonious, we have chosen not to emphasize transaction costs at this stage, 
although we recognize that these are important drivers of vertical scope.  Rather, we focus our 
discussion on capabilities, as these have been shown to be influential for scope decisions and are 
intertwined and interdependent with transaction costs (Argyres and Zenger, 2012).   
 
3There is an assumption implicit in this argument, namely that the amount of attention, time and 
resources that high-level managers devote to external suppliers is less than the time devoted to 
internal teams. The reasoning behind this is that independent suppliers are motivated by residual 
profits and have stronger incentives.  Attention does need to be devoted to handling suppliers, 
haggling, and opportunism but it is likely that these frictions occur irregularly, when transaction 
hazards manifest themselves.  In contrast, monitoring and motivating of internal personnel require 
constant attention. 
 
4We checked whether our results are robust to two alternative measures of breadth, the “entropy” 
measure and a simple “count” measure of the number of different types of projects. The results, which 
are available from the authors upon request, remained unchanged. 
 
5Standardization is required at the contractor level due to some missing data at the project level and 
because the average level of integration of each trade activity varies (e.g., average integration in 
building the metallic structure is higher than in installing gas services).  By standardizing, we avoid 
biases of nonrandom missing data that would bias the aggregated percentage at the contractor level. 
 
6We also computed a variable that counts the number of types of projects per project director. The 
results using this variable are almost identical (available upon request). The reason for this is that, 
given that projects typically last one to two years, using a three years window allows for two projects 
on average; thus, the two measures converge. We also computed a variable with the experience of t-1, 
t-2 and t-3 (not considering the focal year) and the results remained consistent in terms of size and 
sign. However, we lose more than half of the sample, which hurts statistical significance. The 
alternative solution of using t-1 and t-2 is not ideal as projects last typically more than a year –
typically one or two years– and therefore only a small portion of project directors are present in more 
than one project. Given that this leaves some reverse causality problems in our models, we rely on the 
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Hansen test to empirically argue for the validity of the use of “project director experience” and 
“designer experience” as instruments.  
 
7By measuring prior experience relative to the experience of available subcontractors in the local 
market, we obtain a measure of the relative position of the contractor. Given that a relative position in 
a market is not easily affected by an increase in the integration of the previous projects, this variable 
captures more neatly a medium to long-term contractor´s expertise. 
 
8Consistent with the notion that geographic specialization can increase market concentration (Ball, 
2003), our HHI index has an average of 0.23, typically considered “moderately concentrated”. This 
could potentially affect the exogeneity of the instrument, but we addressed this in several ways. First, 
we include contractor size and market share (measured at the region level) as controls.  Second, the 
use of lagged supplier market thinness yields consistent results. Third, our instrumental variable 
estimation does not change if we drop market thinness from the analysis. 
 
9We studied the extent of multicollinearity in Models 1a and 1b. The average VIF is located around 
2.3, and only four variables are above the threshold of 4 (Obrien, 2007), with a maximum VIF of 4.8. 
Therefore, per usual standards, multicollinearity is not a significant concern in our sample. 
 
10Of course, absent a clean theoretically “exogenous” shock/instrument it is hard to be fully certain, 
based only on the Hansen-test and other empirical analysis, about the validity of the IV strategy. This 
issue is particularly salient when trying to test more complex –but arguably more complete– 
theoretical models such as ours (cf., the one-directional model of Rawley & Simcoe, 2010). This 
trade-off between structure in the model to be tested and the clean identification that one can afford is 
a long-standing issue in econometrics (Angrist & Pischke, 2010; Nevo & Whinston, 2010). 
 
11We multiply the predicted value of the breadth of horizontal portfolio obtained from Model 1 
estimated by OLS (excluding the depth of vertical activities and adding Vert_Cap&Trans_Haz) 
with the interaction variable, and use the results (“breadth_hat x coordination demands”) as an 
instrument for the endogenous interaction term: “breadth of horizontal portfolio x coordination 
demands”. An analogous procedure was followed for the interaction between depth of vertical 
activities and coordination demands. Then, in the first stage of the estimation of equation 3 we 
execute two equations, one for the endogenous term “Depth_Ver” and another for the endogenous 
interaction term “Depth_Ver x Coord_Demands”. In both of these first stages all the controls 
variables and instruments –including “breadth_hat x coordination demands”– are covariates 
(except, of course, Depth_Vert and Breadth_Hor). An analogous procedure is used for equation 
4. This way of correcting endogenous interaction terms is based on Wooldridge (2002: 236-237) 
and is consistent with recent econometric theory research on the topic (Bun and Harrison, 2019). 
12 We did not include here a model where all the interactions terms are estimated jointly. That model 
does produce consistent coefficients but their statistical significance is reduced. The problem with 
such a model, and the reason for its exclusion, is that all moderators are measuring the same construct, 
and therefore a joint estimation generates multicollinearity. A marker of this problem is that while 
individual statistical significance suffered, statistical significance in a joint t-test improves. For Tables 
4 and 5 below we proceeded in the same manner, and therefore we did not include models that jointly 
estimated all moderators.  
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Table 1 
Correlation matrix and descriptive statistics. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1 Depth of vertical activities 1.00                     
2 Breadth of horizontal portfolio -0.28 1.00                    
3 Designer experience -0.13 0.21 1.00                   
4 Project director experience  -0.06 0.19 0.13 1.00                  
5 Trade expertise 0.11 0.07 -0.04 0.01 1.00                 
6 Prior interactions with suppliers -0.40 0.22 0.07 0.08 0.18 1.00                
7 Thinness of supplier market 0.19 -0.10 -0.16 -0.05 0.11 -0.03 1.00               
8 Number of projects -0.16 0.47 0.11 0.05 0.28 0.28 -0.12 1.00              
9 Distance to headquarters -0.03 0.21 0.07 -0.01 0.02 0.13 -0.01 0.36 1.00             
10 Distance between projects -0.17 0.51 0.07 0.02 0.11 0.26 -0.02 0.59 0.59 1.00            
11 Contractor size -0.32 0.40 0.12 0.01 0.26 0.35 -0.08 0.57 0.32 0.52 1.00           
12 Uncertainty of main project type 0.16 -0.15 -0.06 -0.06 0.02 -0.08 0.45 -0.19 -0.04 -0.17 -0.23 1.00          
13 Demand imbalance 0.00 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.01 -0.06 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.22 1.00         
14 Contractor market share -0.01 0.10 -0.03 -0.06 0.26 0.08 0.41 0.28 0.23 0.28 0.43 0.11 -0.10 1.00        
15 Geographic dispersion -0.13 0.40 0.07 -0.03 0.05 0.15 0.03 0.53 0.55 0.84 0.43 -0.10 0.03 0.28 1.00       
16 Metropolitan region focus -0.17 0.05 0.06 0.04 -0.09 0.27 -0.29 0.04 -0.10 -0.09 0.02 -0.13 0.00 -0.41 -0.19 1.00      
17 Housing sector focus 0.09 -03 0.02 -0.10 0.12 0.06 -0.05 0.03 -0.03 -0.07 0.01 0.11 -0.07 0.07 -0.05 -0.02 1.00     
18 Market size -0.25 0.29 0.11 0.01 -0.07 0.33 -0.33 0.36 0.26 0.40 0.26 -0.19 0.08 -0.20 0.34 0.72 -0.01 1.00    
19 Procurement centralization 0.13 -0.04 0.01 0.08 0.04 -0.15 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.11 -0.12 -0.05 0.06 0.01 -0.26 -0.09 -0.27 1.00   
20 Design integration 0.09 -0.09 -0.08 0.00 0.23 0.09 0.07  0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.06 -0.05 0.01 0.11  -0.02 0.01 0.10 -0.04 0.01 1.00  
21 Top management team -0.23 0.23 0.04 -0.02 0.15 0.29 0.03 0.28 0.22 0.31 0.38 -0.08 0.03 0.23  0.27 -0.00 -0.06 0.12 -0.03 0.01  1.00 
                       
 Observations 815 815 815 815 729 729 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 815 713 815 812 
 Mean -0.14 0.15 0.12 0.18 0.27 1.43 0.23 3.05 2.91 1.79 9.12 0.64 0.99 0.03 0.11 0.54 0.72 15.09 0.35 0.11 2.92 
 Standard deviation 0.55 0.22 0.16 0.33 0.19 1.02 0.10 3.02 1.98 2.21 1.79 0.29 0.20 0.06 0.21 0.46 0.40 0.96 0.40 0.29 0.86 
 Min -1.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.14 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.37 0 0 1 
 Max 1.24 0.79 0.65 1.00 0.93 8.41 0.87 29.00 7.00 6.90 13.62 1.00 1.54 0.43 0.75 1.00 1.00 16.42 1 1 4 
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Table 2. Random effects and instrumental variables models for horizontal and vertical scope. 
(Note that these are simultaneous models, encompassing two regressions: ‘a’ for horizontal; ‘b’ for vertical) 
 Model 1 Model 2 – Instrumental Variable 
 (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Dependent  
Variable: 
Breadth of 
horizontal 
portfolio 
Depth of vertical 
activities 
Breadth of horizontal 
portfolio 
Depth of vertical 
activities 
Depth of vertical activities -0.046***  -0.046  
 (0.012)  (0.034)  
Breadth of horizontal portfolio  -0.199**  -0.455 
  (0.104)  (0.307) 
Designer experience in  0.173***  0.158***  
different project types (0.040)  (0.040)  
Project director experience in  0.077***  0.079***  
different project types (0.021)  (0.021)  
Trade expertise  0.300***  0.583*** 
  (0.098)  (0.105) 
Prior interactions with   -0.174***  -0.185*** 
Suppliers  (0.026)  (0.025) 
Thinness of supplier market  0.418*  0.452 
  (0.240)  (0.304) 
Number of projects 0.018*** 0.019** 0.018*** 0.017 
 (0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.011) 
Distance to headquarters -0.013*** 0.014 -0.013*** 0.026* 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.013) 
Distance between projects 0.040*** 0.005 0.041*** 0.018 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.025) 
Contractor size 0.011*** -0.076*** 0.009* -0.076*** 
 (0.004) (0.015) (0.005) (0.016) 
Uncertainty of main project type 0.066 -0.135 0.080 -0.200 
 (0.065) (0.206) (0.062) (0.167) 
Demand imbalance -0.044 0.049 -0.032 0.099 
 (0.389) (0.114) (0.036) (0.126) 
Contractor market share -0.231 0.120 -0.044 -0.097 
 (0.159) (0.412) (0.164) (0.564) 
Geographic dispersion -0.069 -0.010 -0.037 -0.061 
 (0.083) (0.146) (0.078) (0.155) 
Metropolitan region focus -0.013 0.093 -0.004 0.074 
 (0.029) (0.074) (0.029) (0.088) 
Housing sector focus -0.116*** 0. 183*** -0.115*** 0.129* 
 (0.020) (0.059) (0.021) (0.080) 
Market size 0.008 -0.084* 0.005 -0.056 
 (0.015) (0.043) (0.015) (0.051) 
Constant -0.186 1.819*** -0.085 1.262 
 (0.216) (0.657) (0.234) (0.079) 
Year fixed effects? YES YES YES YES 
     
Observations 815 1033 729 729 
R-Squared  43.71% 27.59%   
Kleibergen-Paap F-test first stage     27.79 17.01 
Hansen test (p-value)   0.38 (0.82) 0.07 (0.78) 
(†) p < 0.1 *; p < 0.05 **; p < 0.01 ***. Model 1 is estimated using a panel data random effect model. Model 2 is estimated 
using a random effect model with instrumental variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses (Huber-white “sandwich” 
estimator). The IV correction of endogenous interaction terms follows Wooldridge (2002: 236-237).  
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Table 3. Impact of coordination demands on the interdependency of breadth and depth  
(Note that these are simultaneous models, encompassing two regressions: ‘a’ for horizontal; ‘b’ for vertical) 
 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Dependent  
Variable: 
Breadth of 
horizontal 
portfolio 
Depth of 
vertical 
activities 
Breadth of 
horizontal 
portfolio 
Depth of 
vertical 
activities 
Breadth of 
horizontal 
portfolio 
Depth of 
vertical 
activities 
Depth of vertical activities 0.014  -0.030  -0.006  
 (0.035)  (0.039)  (0.033)  
Breadth of horizontal portfolio  -0.109  -0.294  -0.224 
  (0.337)  (0.425)  (0.423) 
Depth of vertical activities x   -0.019***      
Number of projects (0.007)      
Breadth of horizontal portfolio x    -0.122*     
Number of projects  (0.070)     
Depth of vertical activities x     -0.007    
Distance to headquarters   (0.011)    
Breadth of horizontal portfolio x     -0.082   
Distance to headquarters    (0.080)   
Depth of vertical activities x       -0.030**  
Distance between projects     (0.013)  
Breadth of horizontal portfolio x        -0.162** 
Distance between projects      (0.060) 
Number of projects 0.012*** 0.060* 0.017*** 0.018 0.018*** 0.021* 
 (0.005) (0.032) (0.004) (0.114) (0.004) (0.012) 
Distance to headquarters -0.013*** 0.025* -0.013*** 0.033** -0.013*** 0.029** 
 (0.003) (0.014) (0.003) (0.016) (0.003) (0.014) 
Distance between projects 0.043*** 0.003 0.041*** 0.024 0.037*** 0.034 
 (0.007) (0.021) (0.007) (0.025) (0.007) (0.028) 
Rest of covariates? 
(including capabilities and 
constant) 
YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects? YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 729 729 729 729 729 729 
Kleibergen-Paap F-test first stage  21.49 9.51 18.85 11.78 20.62 10.04 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.39 (0.82) 0.03 (0.86) 0.60 (0.73) 0.10 (0.76) 0.35 (0.83) 0.09 (0.876) 
p < 0.1 *; p < 0.05 **; p < 0.01 ***.  Robust standard errors in parentheses (Huber-white “sandwich” estimator). The IV correction of 
endogenous interaction terms follows Wooldridge (2002: 236-237). All models are a random effect model with instrumental variables. 
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Table 4 
The moderating role of centralization on the impact of coordination demands 
(Note that these are simultaneous models, encompassing two regressions: ‘a’ for horizontal; ‘b’ for vertical)  
 Model 6 Model 7 
 (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Dependent  
Variable: 
Breadth of 
horizontal 
portfolio 
Depth of vertical 
activities 
Breadth of 
horizontal 
portfolio 
Depth of vertical 
activities 
Depth of vertical activities 0.002  
(0.049) 
 -0.003  
(0.046) 
 
Breadth of horizontal portfolio  0.366  
(0.388) 
 0.341  
(0.507) 
Depth of vertical activities x Number of projects -0.021**  
(0.008) 
   
Depth of vertical activities x Procurement centralization 0.018  
(0.067) 
   
Depth of vertical activities x Number of projects x 
Procurement centralization 
0.010  
(0.029) 
   
Breadth of horizontal portfolio x Number of projects  -0.199**  
(0.091) 
  
Breadth of horizontal portfolio x Proc. centralization  -1.658***  
(0.584) 
  
Breadth of horizontal portfolio x Number of projects x 
Procurement centralization 
 0.179†  
(0.144) 
  
Number of projects x Procurement centralization 0.018 
 (0.010) 
-0.014  
(0.060) 
  
Depth of vertical activities x Dist. between projects   -0.047**  
(0.021) 
 
Depth of vertical activities x Proc. centralization   -0.014  
(0.056) 
 
Depth of vertical activities x Dist. between projects x  
Procurement centralization 
  0.057  
(0.044) 
 
Breadth of horizontal activities x Dist. between projects    -0.328**  
(0.161) 
Breadth of horizontal activities x Proc. centralization    -1.973** 
 (0.847) 
Breadth of horizontal activities x Dist. between projects x  
Procurement centralization 
   0.427**  
(0.201) 
Dist. between projects x Procurement centralization   0.012 
 (0.014) 
-0.049  
(0.055) 
Number of projects 0.010*  
(0.005) 
0.071*  
(0.036) 
0.017***  
(0.004) 
0.019  
(0.011) 
Distance between projects 0.041***  
(0.007) 
0.010  
(0.023) 
0.032***  
(0.008) 
0.062 
 (0.042) 
Procurement centralization -0.019  
(0.021) 
0.219**  
(0.109) 
0.004 
 (0.017) 
0.214***  
(0.072) 
Rest of covariates? 
(including capabilities and constant) 
YES YES YES YES 
Observations 627 627 627 627 
Kleibergen-Paap F-test first stage   14.20 5.37 13.41 3.49 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.99 (0.61) 0.04 (0.84) 0.53 (0.77) 0.04 (0.84) 
p < 0.1 *; p < 0.05 **; p < 0.01 ***. (†) This triple interaction has a high collinearity, inflating its standard error (the VIF of this triple 
interaction is 13.42); a joint t-test of the derivative d(depth)/d(breadth) has a p-value of 0.0004 (i.e., a joint test of “breadth + breadth*num of 
proj + breadth*cent + breadth*num of proj*cent”), and a joint t-test of the second derivative d(depth)2/d(breadth)d(Number of projects) has a 
p-value of 0.02 (i.e., a joint t-test of “breadth*num of proj + breadth*num of proj* cent”). Robust standard errors in parentheses (Huber-white 
“sandwich” estimator). The IV correction of endogenous interaction terms follows Wooldridge (2002: 236-237).  All models are a random 
effect model with instrumental variables. 
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Table 5 
The moderating role of designer integration on the impact of coordination demands 
(Note that these are simultaneous models, encompassing two regressions: ‘a’ for horizontal; ‘b’ for vertical) 
 Model 8 Model 9 
 (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Dependent  
Variable: 
Breadth of 
horizontal 
portfolio 
Depth of vertical 
activities 
Breadth of 
horizontal 
portfolio 
Depth of vertical 
activities 
Depth of vertical activities 0.010  
(0.036) 
 -0.013  
(0.035) 
 
Breadth of horizontal portfolio  -0.269  
(0.363) 
 -0.169  
(0.429) 
Depth of vertical activities x Number of projects -0.021** 
 (0.009) 
   
Depth of vertical activities x Design integration -0.026  
 (0.082) 
   
Depth of vertical activities x  Number of projects x 
Design integration 
0.025**  
(0.012) 
   
Breadth of Breadth portfolio x Number of projects  -0.135*  
(0.073) 
  
Breadth of horizontal portfolio x Design integration  1.084 
 (1.171) 
  
Breadth of horizontal portfolio x Number of projects x 
Design integration 
 -0.053  
(0.227) 
  
Number of projects x Design integration -0.035***  
(0.011) 
-0.055  
(0.057) 
  
Depth of vertical activities x Dist. between projects   -0.024* 
 (0.014) 
 
Depth of vertical activities x Design integration   0.045 
 (0.077) 
 
Depth of vertical activities x Dist. between projects x  
Design integration 
  -0.021 
 (0.048) 
 
Breadth of horizontal activities x Dist. between projects    -0.140*  
(0.082) 
Breadth of horizontal activities x Design integration    -0.164  
(1.807) 
Breadth of horizontal activities x Dist. between projects  x  
Design integration 
   -0.126 
 (0.859) 
Dist. between projects x  Design integration   -0.027*  
(0.014) 
0.028  
(0.066) 
Number of projects 0.018***  
(0.004) 
0.073  
(0.046) 
0.018***  
(0.004) 
0.018  
(0.013) 
Distance between projects 0.045***  
(0.007) 
0.011  
(0.023) 
0.044***  
(0.008) 
0.026  
(0.035) 
Design integration 0.037  
(0.029) 
0.165  
(0.127) 
-0.015 
 (0.021) 
0.100 
 (0.105) 
Rest of covariates? 
(including capabilities and constant) 
YES YES YES YES 
Observations 729 729 729 627 
Kleibergen-Paap F-test first stage   13.48 4.46 3.77 13.44 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.44 (0.80) 0.18 (0.66) 0.24 (0.89) 0.04 (0.84) 
p < 0.1 *; p < 0.05 **; p < 0.01 ***. Robust standard errors in parentheses (Huber-white “sandwich” estimator). The IV correction of 
endogenous interaction terms follows Wooldridge (2002: 236-237). All models are a random effect model with instrumental variables. 
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Table 6 
Using projects per TMT member as proxy for managerial diseconomies 
(Note that these are simultaneous models, encompassing two regressions: ‘a’ for horizontal; ‘b’ for vertical) 
 Model 10 Model 11 
 (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Dependent  
Variable: 
Breadth of 
horizontal 
portfolio 
Depth of vertical 
activities 
Breadth of 
horizontal 
portfolio 
Depth of vertical 
activities 
 Instrumental 
Variables 
Instrumental 
Variables 
Instrumental 
Variables 
Instrumental 
Variables 
Depth of vertical activities 0.051 
 (0.044) 
 0.041  
(0.052) 
 
Breadth of horizontal portfolio  -0.468  
(0.460) 
  
Depth of vertical activities x Projects per TMT member -0.089*** 
 (0.027) 
 -0.081*** 
 (0.031) 
 
Depth of vertical activities x Procurement centralization   0.047  
(0.083) 
 
Depth of vertical activities x Projects per TMT member x 
Procurement centralization 
  -0.046  
(0.097) 
 
Breadth of horizontal portfolio x Projects per TMT member  -0.442***  
(0.125) 
 -0.494***  
(0.182) 
Breadth of horizontal portfolio x Proc. centralization    -1.644***  
(0.579) 
Breadth of horizontal portfolio x Projects per TMT member 
x Procurement centralization 
   0.588†  
(0.378) 
Projects per TMT member x Procurement centralization   0.010  
(0.027) 
-0.068  
(0.130) 
Projects per TMT member 0.028**  
(0.012) 
0.167***  
(0.056) 
0.024*  
(0.015) 
0.169**  
(0.071) 
Procurement centralization 0.001 
 (0.016) 
0.095* 
 (0.054) 
-0.008  
(0.023) 
0.239**  
(0.106) 
Rest of covariates? 
(including capabilities and constant) 
YES YES YES YES 
Observations 625 625 625 625 
Kleibergen-Paap F-test first stage   20.23  9.85 13.94 5.76 
Hansen test (p-value) 1.55 (0.46) 0.02 (0.88) 1.64 (0.44) 0.06 (0.80) 
p < 0.1 *; p < 0.05 **; p < 0.01 ***. (†) This triple interaction has a high collinearity, inflating its standard error; a joint t-test of the derivative 
d(depth)/d(breadth) has a p-value of 0.003 (i.e., a joint test of “breadth + breadth*num of proj + breadth*cent + breadth*num of proj*cent”), 
and a joint t-test of the second derivative d(depth)2/d(breadth)d(Number of projects) has a p-value of 0.018 (i.e., a joint t-test of “breadth*num 
of proj + breadth*num of proj* cent”). Robust standard errors in parentheses (Huber-white “sandwich” estimator).  The IV correction of 
endogenous interaction terms follows Wooldridge (2002: 236-237). All models are a random effect model with instrumental variables. 
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Figure 1 
Summary of the Hypotheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Interaction effect between “depth of vertical activities” and “number of projects” 
Note: in this graph we plot the following derivative d(breadt)/d(depth) 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
Interaction effect between “breadth of horizontal portfolio” and “number of projects”.  
Note: in this graph we plot the following derivative d(depth)/d(breadth)  
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Figure 4 
Interaction between “Depth of vertical activities” and “distance between projects” 
Note: in this graph we plot the following derivative d(breadt)/d(depth) 
 
 
Figure 5 
Interaction between “breadth of horizontal portfolio” and “distance between projects”. 
Note: in this graph we plot the following derivative d(depth)/d(breadth)  
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Figure 6 
Moderating effect of procurement centralization on the impact of number of projects 
Note: in this graph we plot the following derivative d(depth)/d(breadth) 
 
 
Figure 7 
Moderating effect of procurement centralization on the impact of distance between projects 
Note: in this graph we plot the following derivative d(depth)/d(breadth)  
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Figure 8 
Moderating effect of procurement centralization on the impact of distance between projects 
Notes: (1) in this graph we plot the following derivative d(breadth)/d(depth), (2) for improved presentation, the 
changed the directions of both axes (as compared to the Figures 5 and 6) 
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APPENDIX:  DESCRIPTION OF CONTROL VARIABLES 
Contractor Size. The natural logarithm of the total square meters built by contractor by year. 
Uncertainty in the contractor’s focal type of project. Uncertainty in the contractor’s focal type 
of project can affect diversification through the “risk mitigation” logic (Wang & Barney, 2006).  
The focal type of project is based on the greatest percentage of square meters built in the current 
and prior year. Based on Leiblein and Miller (2003), we measure uncertainty as the squared sum 
of errors for a linear regression of the monthly building permits for each type and each region for 
the past ten years. Due to seasonality, the data were adjusted using the Arima X-12 procedure. 
Demand imbalance across project types. Since firms may tend to diversify away from stagnant 
markets into growing ones, we controlled for this demand imbalance.  We computed the yearly 
growth of the building permits for each contractor’s focal project type for all other types and 
computed the ratio of the former on the later. If this ratio is lower than one, diversification might 
be required to maintain a given sales volume.  
Contractor market share. A contractor with market power might possess the ability to 
inﬂuence the behavior of suppliers and thus not need to vertically integrate.   In construction, 
market power appears to exist at the geographical level (Ball, 2003; Somerville, 1999). We 
measure market share by contractor by comparing its total square meters built to that built by all 
contractors in their region, using a weighted average. 
Geographic dispersion. The geographic dispersion of the contractor might affect its monitoring 
ability and thus, its vertical and horizontal scope. The geographic dispersion is computed by the 
HHI index, using the square meters built by contractor by year in the different regions. 
Metropolitan region focus. Chile is divided in 15 regions, with the main metropolitan region 
accounting for roughly half of the economic activity and having thicker supplier markets. For 
each contractor-year, we computed the percentage of square meters built in this region. 
Housing sector focus. In the construction industry, there is a natural segmentation and 
specialization between housing and infrastructure/commercial sectors, with horizontal 
diversification being easier within versus between sectors. To control for this, we computed the 
percentage of square meters built in housing for each contractor-year. 
Market size. The size of regional markets is measured as the square meters in building permits 
approved in each region of Chile. This information is supplied yearly by the Chilean Ministry of 
Statistics. To measure of market size at the contractor, we sum the sizes of the markets in which 
a contractor is executing a project, and then take the natural logarithm of this measure.  
Time fixed effects. We include time dummies to control for time-varying unobserved 
heterogeneity. For example, during 2009 and 2010 there was an important downturn in the 
construction industry, which may bias our results if not accounted for. 
 
 
